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MORALITY AND NATURE: EVOLUTIONARY
CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS
by Johan De Tavernier
Abstract. Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the
unique character of humannature. Personalists believe that themind is
never reducible tomaterial and physical substance. The human person
is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to
free-willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the
reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self-consciousness. But since
Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots
in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature.
Historically, Thomas Huxley, Darwin’s bulldog, agreed with Darwin
on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral
behavior. Huxley’s “saltationism” has recently been characterized by
Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the
end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization
processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature?
Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the hu-
man being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with
their ancient roots?
Keywords: Anthropology; Christianity; emotion; evolutionary
biology; morality; personhood; Thomas Aquinas
We intend to investigate the evolutionary challenges to Christian ethics in
order to move the discussion from mutual anathemas to a more nuanced
and restrained engagement (Pope 2013). Taking seriously the outcome of
evolutionary biology, Christian ethics has to accept its evidence for the
underlying material biological conditions of human existence. The accep-
tance of emergent complexity, reconciling necessity (“law-like regularities”)
and chance (“contingency”), forms the background against which we will
talk about the natural roots of morality. Biological knowledge about the
natural roots of morality raises many questions about human agency, free
will, and human freedom in respect of moral responsibility.
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The question of the impact of biology on ethics has gradually become
urgent since the publication of Darwin’s The Descent of Man in 1871.
Generally, we can distinguish a premodern and a modern position within
Christian ethics. Traditionally, Christian ethicists accepted in the wake of
Aristotle biological insights as a basis for their virtue ethics against the
background of a belief in the scala naturae. Since modernity ethicists were
assuming that human subjects were able to overcome their biological an-
tecedents (nature) by socialization processes (nurture). In line with this,
most of contemporary Christian ethicists still presuppose a sharp distinc-
tion between nature and nurture. While in premodern theologies nature
and person are rather presented as two complementary notions, modern
theological ethics see often persons as the counterpoint of nature and
accentuate in manifold ways the uniqueness of the human species. Per-
sonalists believe that the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the
reflexive rationality of the human being, underscores the original nature of
self-conscious beings.
But is this in the light of Darwin’s insights not a misrepresentation
of reality? How relevant is the evolutionary thinking for interpreting the
human capacity to act, for both the understanding of moral motivation and
the justification of moral acting? Moreover, recent biomedical research, in
particular molecular genetics, neurobiology, and psychology contributed to
a better understanding of human behavior. How to link these new scientific
insights about our biological nature to ethical insights in a meaningful way?
DARWIN, ESSENTIALISM, AND EVOLUTION
In traditional representations of the scala naturae, also called the Great
Chain of Being, the biological species diversity is shown as eternally un-
changeable, reflecting a fixed hierarchy, ranked higher or lower depend-
ing on perfection. The Swedish physician and botanist Carolus Linnaeus
(1707–1778) put an end to this essentialist understanding of the scala
naturae. In early versions of Systema Naturae (e.g., 1735) he still defends
the classic “scala naturae” but in a later edition (1766), the reference is
deleted. Linnaeus gathered so much empirical data that he could hardly
hold on to speak about a fixed hierarchy. Systema Naturae is a reference
work for Charles Darwin. He is intrigued by Linnaeus’ gradualist view
of nature (“natura non facit saltum”—“Nature makes no leaps”; Darwin
1871, ch. VI). During his studies at Cambridge (1829–1831) the young
Darwin still accepts the idea of a supernatural cause to explain the origin
of life forms, including human life. An intelligent designer, a skilled divine
engineer is the first cause of everything. In his autobiography he describes
how the careful study of William Paley’s Natural Theology; or, Evidences of
the Existence and Attributes of the Deity. Collected from the Appearances of
Nature (1802) gives him intellectual pleasure. He appreciates the reading
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of it: “The logic of this book and, as I may add, of his ‘Natural Theology,’
gave me as much delight as did Euclid. ( . . . ) I did not at that time trouble
myself about Paley’s promises and taking these on trust, I was charmed and
convinced by the long line of argumentation.” (The Autobiography [1887]
2010; Desmond and Moore 1991; 3rd ed. 2009, 107–108). Complex life
forms do not arise by chance, says Paley. Just as a watch implies a watch-
maker, a sense as the eye is created by an intelligent designer. For Paley
and many theologians after him, complexity could not arise by chance
(Buskes 2006; 4th ed. 2008, 15). His “argument from design” presumes
the immutability of species (Buskes 2010, 61). Each species has its specific
essence, created by God. After the voyage with the Beagle (1831–1836)
and the many field observations Darwin realized that evolution is quite
able to mimic an intelligent designer. At that time, he is already familiar
with the fact that selection of desirable traits in plants and animals involves
breeding but seeks for an explanation of the variation in the state of na-
ture. The reading of Robert Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population
(1798) will bring him to the idea of natural selection. He observes that
the possessor of more suitable characteristics has a greater adaptability in
a specific context and thus can survive more easily. Favorable variation is
rewarded by natural selection: “But if variations to any organic being do
occur, assuredly individuals thus characterized will have the best chance
of being preserved in the struggle for life” (Darwin 1859, 127). The par-
ticular type of food explains why one could find insectivorous and nectar
drinking finches with a pointed beak on one island, while on the other
island finches have a short, thick beak because they have cracked nuts and
seeds for centuries. Based on this empirical data, Darwin definitely swore
off essentialism (Darwin 1859, 471, 488–489).
What led Darwin to think about evolution? In the first part of The
Descent of Man Darwin develops three arguments that give support to the
idea of a gradual evolution and therefore advocate a common ancestor. He
develops this argument in the light of new knowledge about the origin and
age of the earth. After reading Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1830)
during his voyage with the Beagle, Darwin get convinced of uniformitari-
anism, invented by the Scottish geologist James Hutton. Hutton defends
in his Theory of the Earth (1795) that strata were formed by millions of
years-long processes of sedimentation and erosion and alternation of glacial
periods and sea level rises and falls. The earth is much older than creation-
ists claim. Also new knowledge of the fossil record is important in this
respect. The biogeography shows Darwin that the distribution of plant
and animal species was not homogenous.
Against this background, Darwin developed a threefold argument for
the gradual evolution to apply to humans. The first argument comes
from anatomy, in particular the homologous bone structure, trunk and
limbs, blood vessels, tissues, muscles, and the nervous system (Darwin
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1871, chapter 1). The second argument comes from embryology. Young
embryos of vertebrate mammals (he compares embryos of man and dogs)
are hardly distinguishable, indicating a common ancestor. He describes
how he fully agrees with Thomas Huxley’s conclusion in Man’s Place in
Nature: “Without question, the mode of origin and the early stages of
development of man are identical with those of the animals immediately
below him in the scale; without a doubt in these respects, he is far nearer
to apes than the apes are to the dog” (Darwin 1871; chapter 1, 17). The
third argument comes from a comparison of the vestigial limbs of both
humans and animals. In het human body there are numerous remnants of
evolution that are no longer necessary, such as hairiness, the worm-like end
of the appendix, wisdom tooth, the nipple of men, the coccyx/tailbone,
ear muscles, and the muscle m. plantaris in the lower leg. Why would the
Creator have created superfluous things, asks Darwin.
His “dangerous idea” that the rich and complex diversity of life forms
can be fully explained through natural selection mechanisms, works as a
corrosive acid vis-a`-vis the traditional creationist view. But what about the
mental powers ofmen?Having unbeatablemental faculties is no convincing
contra-indication against evolution for Darwin. In chapter 5, he refers
to Alfred Russel Wallace who states in a speech for the Anthropological
Society at London on March 1, 1864, that we can say that man is a
thousand centuries on earth and that we cannot even rule out that maybe
man existed already for hundred thousand centuries on earth (Wallace
1864). Moreover, we know that man has known extinct species. On the
difference between man and animals, Wallace writes that natural selection
has a strong impact on animals. A slight injury or temporary illness can be
fatal because individuals in competition with predators are left to their fate.
Among most animals, there is no question of a division of labor because
each animal should handle everything on its own, while among humans, it
is different. Human beings are social and sympathetic. Even in the harshest
tribes food is usually provided for those who get sick and old. Less active
people fish and gather fruit, the fastest hunt. Food is shared and distributed.
In the human world, mental and moral qualities such as sympathy, a sense
of justice, self-control, and the possibility at prospecting the future do play
a much larger role. Tribes who explore these opportunities have advantage
over other ones and are superior to other tribes. Tools, clothing, fire use,
shelter, cooking, thinking ahead will ensure that the body does not have to
adapt to the changing context. It is different in the animal world. When a
carnivore because of scarcity should switch from hunting sheep to hunting
buffalo’s, only the strongest animals will survive because claws and tooth
only gradually adjust to the new challenge (Wallace 1864, clxiii). During
winter time, larger animals need more fur and fat or else they die. Only the
one who physically adjust, can survive. But men do not need long nails,
toes, or a larger body weight. He/she makes sharper spears, constructs a
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trap to get meat and plant seeds of its favorite foods (Wallace 1864, clxiii).
People make warmer clothes and build better houses while their natural
body remains as naked as before.
Darwin endorses the idea that once men has intellectual, mental, and
moral skills that distinguish him/her from lower life forms, they make
it apparently easier to respond faster and in an original way to new and
challenging living conditions. How does the ethical fit in this picture?
Unlike mathematics, physics, and other scientific disciplines, evolutionary
biology has far-reaching implications for the understanding of ethics, also
for Christian ethics. Central to the debate is the fifth chapter ofThe Descent
of Man wherein Darwin focuses on the evolutionary roots of morality.
DARWIN ON EVOLUTION AND MORALITY
Wallace emphasizes that culture compensates for the human deficit in
biological terms (see Gehlen 1940, 1956, 1970). Darwin seems more
nuanced. He notices that many analogies were found between human and
animal behavior. Hesitantly he describes how the same emotions form
the basis of moral behavior in animals and humans: fear and courage,
affection and disgust, playfulness and seriousness, care for the offspring.
Just as humans primates are excited as they can help each other and become
stressed in grief. Both internalize group values and are sensitive to good
and disapproval of own behavior by supporters. Via the emotions most
animals also have a social character, and know forms of cooperation and
are concerned about the welfare of their children (e.g., elephants, ants, and
buffalo). The capacity for sympathy and empathy is not strange to most
mammals. Wolves help each other, dogs have a great empathy and are a
paragon of loyalty and obedience (Darwin 1871, 77). In many animals
social instincts and group loyalty are rewarded because social behavior
contributes to the survival of the group.
Darwin observes similar behavior in humans: helpfulness compared to
acquaintances, crave sociality, loyalty, and obedience. Humans also react
partly instinctively, are most often naturally sympathetic and happy as they
can help each other while getting stressed in case of grief. So he mainly
sees continuity between animals and humans, even in the moral domain.
Contra-indications are however, the lack of care for sick and old animals,
and especially conscience, for Darwin the main difference between humans
and animals. But if animals should have equivalent intellectual abilities as
humans, they would probably also have a conscience (Darwin 1871, 71–
72, 78). On the one hand he acknowledges that the difference in mental
strength between a highly evolved ape and a primitive man is immense, on
the other hand he points out that forms of self-consciousness—including
memory capacity—are known to some animals, the nearest to human
beings.
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Darwin’s conclusion is clear: man is the product of a continuous and
gradual evolution and the same goes for moral behavior. He also observes
that evolution does not even have to exclude altruism. At that time, he could
not explain it but describes already how the evolutionary process alongside
ruthlessness also made gentleness visible. The inspiration for linking self-
interest and sympathy came from the Scottish moral philosopher Adam
Smith. The relationship is not always visible because as often happens in
evolution, the immediate impetus for the emergence of behavior became
separated from the effects that have been created by evolution. But the
expression is still there, even if the pay-offs are no longer relevant.
DARWIN’S GRADUALISM VERSUS HUXLEY’S SALTATIONISM
Originally, the physician and philosopher Thomas Huxley was not con-
vinced about the “development theory” as the theory of evolution is orig-
inally called, as he mentioned in a lecture to the Royal Institute in 1855.
That changed after contact with Darwin. Darwin has the habit to discuss
his ideas in small groups and he once invited Huxley. In 1858, a draft
version of a paper on natural selection, meant for a lecture for the Linnean
Society, is discussed. After reading the article, Huxley would have said how
extraordinarily stupid it was not to have thought of natural selection. Hux-
ley’s defense of Darwin starts with an anonymous rave review of The Origin
of Species in the Times (December 26, 1859). Not unjustly, he gets later
nicknamed as “Darwin’s bulldog.” A sharp reaction came from Richard
Owen, chair of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, who
wrote an anonymous scathing review for the Edinburgh Review (3 [1860]
487–532) and asked the Oxford bishopWilberforce to do the same for the
Quarterly Review (1860, 225–264).
In Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature (1863), Huxley shows anatom-
ical evidence (form of brain, bone structure) to support the relationship
between apes and human beings. But Darwin’s best friend does differ with
him on an important point, namely the origin of moral behavior in hu-
mans. Why? Huxley cannot imagine that the rich diversity is due to small,
gradual steps as Darwin thinks. Of course, there is, according to Huxley, a
physical impact of nature on the human condition, but people are able—
if they want—to control nature. In the Romanes Lecture on Evolution
and Ethics (1893), he compares this task with the weeding of a gardener.
Human ethics is a victory over brute evolutionary forces (Ruse 2009, xxi).
Huxley sees morality as a distinctive mark between humans and animals
in the sense that only humans are moral beings who are capable of being
moral by distinguishing themselves from nature. So morality is not an
extension of animal behavior nor part of human nature. Our ancestors
actedmentally competent bymaking explicit choices based on free will, not
by evolution. Social behavior is for him a completely cultural phenomenon.
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Human beings have transcended their biological roots andwere also obliged
to do this if they want to make progress (Ruse 2009, 81).
If we look at the debate today, we see that the majority of Christian ethi-
cists follow Huxley’s saltationism. Saltationists presume macro-mutations
(in Latin: saltare which means “to jump”). A mild variant of saltationism
is the theory of “punctuated equilibrium” from the Harvard evolutionary
biologist Stephen Jay Gould and paleontologist Niles Eldredge (Gould
and Eldridge 1993, 223; Gould 1999). The followers of Huxley defend
the view that humans are moral beings by culture, education, and the
social environment in which they dwell (nurture). Moral behavior is the
result of socialization processes. In that sense, George C. Williams presents
morality as an “accidental capacity, resulting from biological processes,
that normally is not appropriate to bring such a capacity to an expression”
(Williams 1988, 437–438).
For Darwinists like philosopher and sociologist Edvard Westermarck
(Westermarck 1906), biologist Edward O.Wilson and primatologist Frans
de Waal, Huxley’s “veneer-theory about morality” suggests that morality is
merely “a cultural overlay, a thin veneer hiding an otherwise selfish and
brutish nature” (deWaal 2006, 6; deWaal 2009). In line with Darwin they
see morality as the further development of social instincts and emotions
such as anger, shame, protest, pity, and grief. De Waal considers them
as essential “building blocks of morality” which we evolutionary share with
other primates. For gradualists, it is not important to knowwhether animals
can be moral but whether they have the capacity to reciprocity and revenge,
and whether they have a sufficient capacity for sympathy and empathy to
settle disputes and can help if needed, and whether they respect social rules
(Flack and de Waal 2000).
In the debate between the two “schools” are the following glaring ques-
tions: what could we do with the acquired knowledge of evolutionary
biology on morality? Which implications does the knowledge that man
is evolutionary evolved have for the understanding of morality? What has
evolutionary biology to say about moral action, for example about charity
and altruism? If the origin of moral action could be found in nature, can
there be question of freedomor is our behavior biologically preprogrammed
(genes, inheritance)? Could the origins of morality be found in nature or is
morality a cultural phenomenon (education, social environment)? Finally,
whether a gradualist conception of evolutionary biology does not necessar-
ily end up in a kind of corrosion of ethics and in an undermining of the
(theological)-anthropological views used in ethics?
IS COOPERATION POSSIBLE IN THE STATE OF NATURE?
Many Christian ethicists may fear that to follow a Darwinian view would
imply to embrace a Hobbesian view of human nature. Evolutionary
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biologists thoroughly disagree with Hobbes’ description of the state of
nature. For Hobbes the state of nature is characterized by a constant war
against all which leaves no room for empathy, compassion, and altruism.
Only a sovereign who demands from each a piece of political freedom in Q2
exchange for personal safety or a social contract model are able to avoid
a state of permanent violence. Evolutionary biologists do not think that
this is an adequate description of the state of nature (de Waal 2006, 3–4).
What kind of explanation do they offer for the willingness to cooperate in a
selfish environment wherein only survival counts? An evolutionary starting
point presumes that even in natural environments there is a will to coop-
eration, as is the case in the works of E. O. Wilson and de Waal. But how
does cooperation arise in the state of nature in the absence of a compelling
central authority? Both evolutionary biologists argue that morality is not
the result of a cultural process but rather the opposite: culture, included
morality, is the end product of a long evolutionary process. Moral systems
arise as the result of the need to avoid escalation of conflicts, to ensure
personal safety through the maintenance of a social order.
But what explains that there are forms of collaboration in an environ-
ment where apparently only self-interest counts? And can cooperation also
be the result of altruism or is it always the result of enlightened self-interest,
related to self-preservation on mid term or long term? In recent decades
there has beenmuch research into whetherDarwinism can explain the roots
of normative ethics. The breakthrough came with the rise of sociobiology
that presented reflexively different models of kin altruism and reciprocal
altruism by showing that the Darwinian principle of fitness also enhances
the willingness to help others (Radcliffe Richards 2000; 5th edn. 2008,
162–164). Natural selection mechanisms could play a role in promoting
altruism. To explain this, evolutionary biologists refer to game theory. John
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern describe the interaction between
two parties as a strategic game (von Neumann and Morgenstern [1994]
2004). Suppose that each participant behaves rationally (i.e., aims at maxi-
mizing its own profit), what is the better strategy? Both authors distinguish
between zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. In the latter case, there could
be cooperation. It is not unconditional altruism—the risk of exploitation
remains high—but a kind of reciprocal altruism is possible. Sociobiolo-
gist Robert Trivers typifies this strategy as tit-for-tat strategy, which means
that a temporary sacrifice is considered as acceptable because one expects
to be refunded later for it (Trivers 1971). Game theorist Robert Axelrod
shows that tit-for-tat strategies are preferable in specific contexts (Axelrod
1984, 54). For instance, one can choose to avoid unnecessary conflicts by
collaborating in the hope that others will do the same.
Axelrod also points out that emotions are the lubricant to obtain coop-
eration in the long run. The greater the emotional involvement, the more
it allows us to take advantage from social relations. It is not a cold rational
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assessment strategy. On the one hand, if we think of kin altruism, we un-
derstand that within family relations we do not make a cost-benefit analysis
and do not usually ask ourselves whether we have received enough from
brothers and sisters on our birthday. Mutual affection is able to justify even
asymmetric input (e.g., care of children by parents). On the other hand the
calculated reciprocity of reciprocal altruism is also rooted in emotions: the
honor to fulfill promises, the impending guilt if we would be exposed as
impostor, sadness if anyone else around us is dishonest, cheerfulness when
we meet an altruist. Not only humans but also apes know these emotions
and sentiments. De Waal and Wilson (de Waal 2006) claim that the will-
ingness to cooperate has emotional roots. Instead of pursuing everywhere
and in any context potential gain and maximalizing profits, both humans
and animals are afraid of loss and betrayal because they know that love
can easily turn into revenge, jealousy, and envy. Conscience is therefore
described by evolutionary biologists as a functional emotion that helps dis-
tinguish between self-interest and group interest. The latter is best served
with respect, generosity, altruism, and cooperation.
The fact that murder, rape, and robbery are universally recognized as
crimes, indicates that morality is a code of conduct, arising from the bio-
logical need for cooperation. It contributes a lot to solidarity with the other
group members, creates harmony and team spirit. At first sight a merely
cultural product, turns out to be in reality the result of biological necessity,
for de Waal. Who shares this vision, is not expecting too much; striving
for a universal brotherhood for example, is highly utopian and not very
realistic. For gradualists like Wilson, morality is certainly not exclusively
a cultural given but the logical consequence of a natural process (Wilson
1975, 562). Who sees morality from an evolutionary viewpoint, renounces
the idea of an absolute foundation for morality. This has important con-
sequences and risks to downsize our moral capacities. Wilson’s description
of the engagement of Mother Theresa for the dying of Calcutta, may illus-
trate a certain reductionist tendency: he typifies it as a cynical expression of
egoism (self-serving), purely motivated by “biological imperatives” (Wilson
2004, 166).
NATURALISM, FREE WILL, AND RESPONSIBILITY
Illustrative for the impact of evolutionary psychology in undermining the
exclusive character of human phenomena is the distance of Jean-Pierre
Changeux vis-a`-vis his master Jacques Monod, who considered the tran-
sition to speech and the appearance of the neo-cortex as a coincidence
which implied that the human is qualitatively different (Monod 1970,
174). Changeux specifies in L’Homme de ve´rite´ (2004) that the differ-
ence between an animal and a human brain is rather quantitatively than
qualitatively, an idea which he mentioned already in L’Homme neuronal
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(Changeux 1983, 87). It all seems a matter of brain size. But what has
triggered from an evolutionary viewpoint the larger brain size in humans is
still not yet fully elucidated. Neurobiologist and Nobel laureate Gerald M.
Edelman points to the speed with which human consciousness, the result
from the complex morphology of the brain, has appeared, mainly due to
the rapid increase in brain size (Edelman 1992, 17).
There is even less consensus about the implications of this naturalist
approach. Wolf Singer, for instance, concludes from this scientific fact that
the Homo sapiens sapiens has no free will (Singer 2002, 175). He cannot
imagine that human beings can be free in a deterministic world. That does
not involve that ethics becomes an illusion; the moral undertaking can
continue to exist as an autonomous discourse but we have to realize that
it is fiction, as is defended by the Dutch brain scientist Victor Lamme and
the Flemish philosopher and neuroscientist Jan Verplaetse: “The idea that
a conscious ‘I’ is at the controls, is an illusion” (Verplaetse 2011, 14). Since
we cannot control our actions, we cannot be held responsible for what
we are doing, according to Verplaetse, who disagrees with Lamme because
he still believes that the disappearance of free will does not necessarily
constitute a threat for our thinking about guilt and responsibility. On
the contrary, for Verplaetse, the notion of guilt has become irrelevant
while for Paul Thagard this does not mean that we would no longer
control ourselves or lose our capacity for rational judgment (Thagard
2010, 138). In general, determinists believe that deliberately acting is
an illusion, presupposing that the existence of free will is incompatible
with the causal closeness of the physical universe. On the other hand
compatibilists combine a moderately deterministic vision with the freedom
to choose. This perspective is, for instance, assumed by psychologist Daniel
Kahneman who explains in his dual-process theory how a nonvoluntary,
automatically operating model of reasoning (System 1) intertwines with a
voluntary, consciously reflexive model of reasoning (System 2) (see Vainio
on “Imago Dei and Human Rationality” in this issue). Based on the idea
that we could do something else than what we did (the principle of alternate
possibilities), compatibilists believe that freedom of choice is possible,
therefore stating that indeterminism opens the possibility of robust moral
responsibility and “ultimate authorship” (Mawson 2011, 56).
What could we learn from scientific interpretations of consciousness
for understanding ethics (Boniolo and de Anna 2006, 2)? Do they only
explain the human moral capacity by stating that all cognitive capacities
have a biological basis? Or do they also justify it (Rottschaefer 1998)?
Defenders of weaker forms of naturalism will accept that in addition to
scientific explanations also other explanations are conceivable. Stronger
forms of naturalism argue that natural sciences could explain ethical be-
havior, but not justify. A third position is that science cannot only explain
but also justify ethics. Most authors choose a weak form of naturalism
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that explains some characteristics of moral behavior. For instance, Boniolo
suggests that evolutionary biology can explain the “enabling conditions”
for the human moral capacity but neither explain moral judgments nor
justify ethical systems. De Anna thinks that evolutionary thoughts help
understanding the origin of our ethically relevant cognitive ability but only
in conjunction with nonbiological considerations. To some extent, moral
capacities are an accidental evolutionary outcomemade possible by evolved
mental properties. Michael Ruse defends a stronger form of naturalism.
He believes that some form of normativity successfully can be explained
by evolutionary knowledge. Because we know that evolution is rudderless,
we need justification. However, for Ruse—also for Wilson—it accounts
for a happy illusion (Ruse and Wilson 1985; Ruse 2006, 21). There are
no reasons to become pessimistic about this since we also realize that the
illusion will not disappear soon because of its firm roots in deeply anchored
moral sentiments.
INCLINATIONS AND VIRTUES
Evolutionary biology instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that
are programmed by evolution into our nature. This was not a strange
idea to the classics. For Aristotle and Aquinas, animals and human have
emotions and passions in common (Summa 1a2ae, Q. 40, art. 3). Aquinas
describes passions as joy, anger, love, hate, desire, sadness, aggression, hope,
and fear. However, human beings are able to control them by reason.
Aquinas doubts on Aristotle’s granting animals even cognitive capacities,
such as “prudence,” albeit gradually different from humans (see Darwin
1872; Deane-Drummond 2004, 83). But modernity gradually developed
a dualist perspective on human/culture/reason and animal/nature/body
and depreciated the latter. To the degree that the Christian tradition has
embraced modernity, a nature-culture dichotomy in combination with a
particular theological anthropology has been very influential. For instance,
the personalist tradition aligned with this modern dichotomy. However,
for the classics it was a mistake to think that behavior was either exclu-
sively biological or cultural. Nature and culture are intimately intertwined.
Aquinas’ idea that we will better know ourselves if we observe animal be-
havior, has been lost. He recognizes that animals are sensitive and possess
a certain decision power, though theirs is not comparable to the human
free will (Baranzke 2002, 171, 191). And we share with them numerous
natural inclinations that are at the basis of social tendencies, such as the
desire to know, the desire for companionship, and the desire for food and
sex. The good life for humans, partly based on reasonableness, is the result
of checks and balances in inclinations, passions, and reflection.
Understanding the biology of our nature will make us more alert to the
innate urge to lie, even for the better, for the tendency to be blind for
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our weaknesses, to cover vices and to justify prejudices. Alisdair MacIntyre
concludes his Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the
Virtues (1999): “In After Virtue I had attempted to give an account of the
place of the virtues, understood as Aristotle has understood them, within
social practices, the lives of individuals and the lives of communities, while
making that account independent of what I called Aristotle’s ‘metaphysical
biology.’ Although there is indeed good reason to repudiate important
elements in Aristotle’s biology, I now judge that I was in error in supposing
an ethics independent of biology to be possible . . . ” (MacIntyre 1999, x).
In fact, he accepts that humans are animals too. Our reflexive capacity does
not make us so different because we share with animals purposeful action,
social needs, and beliefs. Although rationality gives us a “second nature”
beyond our physical nature, there is also a lot of continuity that helps us
better grasp human needs. We are not born as autonomous moral agents
and need to be nurtured in order to become free agents. This process of
nurturing has not much to do with learning to solve ethical dilemmas
by discussing and arguing value conflicts. Yet, there is still the need to
grow in intelligibility through participation in the culture of the smaller
and broader communities to which we belong, because we are born in
a culture, but not just as Lockean blank slates. He acknowledges that it
has no sense to deal with the good, norms, and virtues without paying
attention to the biological constitution of humans and explaining how the
ethical discourse connects to this and could remain consistent with the
biological findings.
CONSCIOUSNESS
Antonio Damasio distinguishes the self-as-object that interprets the mate-
rial “me” (conscience-noyau) and the self-as-subject-and-knower (conscience
e´tendue). The self-as-object is about phenomenal consciousness; for in-
stance, what we experience when we taste chocolate or are drunk. We
are not self-aware of what is happening but we just experience (Damasio
2003). This kind of consciousness we share with animals. The last “I”—
the self-as-subject-and-knower—cannot be caught by biological or mental
processes. Damasio talks about a turning point in biological evolution.
The decisive step in the growth of this type of consciousness is subjectivity,
which means that we are able to make representations of ourselves. Put
in evolutionary biological perspective: First, there is the “proto self with
primordial sentiments” (proto-soi) (combining sensory data with control-
ling of information processing in fish), then ‘the core self, driven by acting’
(le soi central or a type of primitive consciousness), and finally “the auto-
biographical self,” capable to include rationality, reflection, deliberation,
self-awareness, and even spirituality (Ganoczy 2008, 124–126; Damasio
2010).
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Subjectivity is an emergent property. It is the result of a progressive
awareness that is strongly influenced by basal emotions like pleasure, suf-
fering, satisfaction, and anger. A good description of this “core self” can
be found in the work of Jane Goodall who describes how a chimpanzee
can set up a primitive reasoning. The primitive animal consciousness is
the indispensable basis for the autobiographical self. The evolutionary de-
veloped mental abilities (language, intelligence, decision power, memory
capacity, capacity for abstraction) give human beings a superior conscious-
ness (Edelman 1992; Changeux 2004, 294). Edelman uses the notion of
“transcendence” in the sense that animals are only able to adapt to the
real, while humans have the ability to think imaginary. The very imagery
(conceptual and abstract thinking, art forms, religious experience) makes
humans capable to distance themselves from conditioned reflexes, and to
judge about them in a lucid way.
Damasio sees human beings as a mix of rationality and emotion. He
points out how moments where a well practiced unconscious mind is
trained under the supervision of conscious reflection, are interspersed with
moments where we let ourselves be guided by unconscious, deeply rooted,
ancient biological inclinations, passions, and desires (Damasio 2010). We
often play in both registers. However, we think that we always act under
conscious control of the self but this is rather an illusion. In that sense, he
developed a rather unique understanding of free will, referring to Daniel
Wegner who describes the conscious will as the somatic stamp of personal
authorship, an emotion that confirms that the self is the authentic owner of
the action. By the feeling to perform an act, we get a conscious awareness
of the will, which is linked to the act (Damasio 2010). Without the
feeling of authorship, we would not be able to record moral responsibility.
But the unpredictable human behavior—our “yes” is often a “no” and
vice versa—can only be consistent if we are willing to analyze and to
evaluate our behavior and to reflect constantly on our less conscious acts
(Vincent 1986, 177) . Wisdom is only reserved for those who accept that Q3
becoming virtuous needs a long period of training (Cincent 2002, 177;
Ganoczy 2008, 131–132) . Less and nonconscious processes that explain Q4
why we so often neglect what we really ought to do, are often insufficiently
“educated.” We realize that it is better to eat healthier and exercise more,
and yet we often do not change our habits. Our biological nature prefers for
evolutionary reasons the consumption of sugars and fats. The advertising
propaganda machine is conveniently using the “weak” point to promote
the consumption of what we’d better not touch (Nelissen 2011, 72–76).
But we realize that we will eat only wiser and more responsible when we
develop long and ritualized skills (e.g., regular fasting) in order to aptly
restrict these natural impulses.
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CHRISTIAN ETHICS?
As far as the natural sciences explain the basis conditions for human action
and in as far as they do not justify moral behavior, they need to form
no threat for Christian ethics. On the contrary, a neurobiological and
psychological clarification of the emotions that are relevant to the capacity
for moral action (be it by way of hindrance or promotion) contributes to
a better understanding of the moral commitment. Human beings always
act from certain motives and desires that are biologically rooted (Joyce
2007, 9–10).What concerns the relative role of neurosciences in explaining
(im/a)moral behavior,Damasio refersmainly to the contribution of positive
and negative feelings as a basis for moral behavior, for example, the sense
of outrage which the late Ste´phane Hessel as the father of the indignados,
has made his trademark (Damasio 2003; Hessel 2010).
Those who take feelings seriously can accept that other sentient be-
ings demonstrate “empathy, sympathy, attachment behavior, confusion,
dominant pride, and humble submission.” Acts of conspecifics may be
intuitionally disapproved or approved by me. This intuition has a form of
premoral competence. Long before there have been thought of intelligent
constructions (for example theories of justice) to shape normative social
behavior, these intuitional feelings played a role in the development of
cooperation strategies among nonhuman species that use social emotions.
However, the trend toward more complexity is such that cultural ele-
ments came more to the fore. The perception of obligations, the degree
of responsibility, and the codification of rules are of course quite unique
and are therefore called “culture.” But the distant relationship with nature
still remains and sometimes the relationship becomes more visible, for
example, in the ambiguity of character traits as dominance and docility
regarding traditional values. Docility is useful for any organization that
strives for a consensus in conflicts but it can also lead to unacceptable
forms of resignation, submissive assent, the acceptance of tyranny, and the
unreasonable subordination of individuality to group interest. Christian
ethics in its traditional form had great attention to biological mechanisms
that block or promote ethical behavior. Knowledge of evolution is capa-
ble of deepening Christian understanding of the biological factors that
influence virtues and sin (Pope 2007, 4) . Traditionally moral education Q5
was practicing and ritualizing moral skills and asceticism, needed to get a
grip on partly unconscious natural processes that always threaten to drive
behavior in an arbitrary way.
Christian ethics can certainly live with the idea that evolutionary biology
teaches us that morality is a mix of culture and nature, unlike many
common cultural determinist views on Christian ethics. In this sense, the
argument of Wilson that morality is a combination of nature and culture,
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inheritance and environment, has to be more scrupulously studied (Wilson
1975, 562).
NATURE AND/OR PERSON?
The consensus text in Gaudium et Spes no. 51 (“ . . . according to objective
criteria, based on the nature of the person . . . ”), so often discussed after
the council among the defenders of personalism and those of natural law,
could receive a new interpretation (McCormick 2006, 14–16). In official
magisterial teachings it is often suggested that an orientation to normative
moral choice can be detected in nature. The idea that in nature a kind of
moral intelligibility could be discovered which justifies normativity, is radi-
cally contested by personalist ethicists. For them, not biological nature but
the person is the decisive assessment criterion. Personalists rightly criticize
natural law but pay at the same time little attention to issues associated
with “nature,” spontaneous emotions and natural tendencies which all were
the starting point of a realistic Christian ethics in ancient times. From this
perspective, the document of the International Theological Commission
“In Search of a Universal Ethics: A New Look at Natural Law” (2008) is also
a missed opportunity.
A better position is taken by Jean Porter. For her natural inclinations
and emotions are morally relevant, though not morally determinant. She
opposes a conception of natural law that reduces the normative significance
of nature to practical rationality. Moreover, she thinks that an abstract, a
historical interpretation of the natural law does not correspond to the
Christian idea that creation in itself is good. Scholasticism believed that
human nature including the prerational, biological roots of behavior, were
morally meaningful and would therefore not have a problem in integrating
modern scientific insights (Porter 2005, 51). But, although an important
biological substrate of human nature is still there, the person is much more
than a biological being. A good life for persons can never be claimed, as
the Stoa says, to be “life according to nature.” We have to distinguish
between natural aspects that must be suppressed and aspects that should
be encouraged. The Christian tradition provides relevant criteria for this.
For theological ethics anno 2013, it is important to recognize that an
appropriate interpretation of the Darwinian theory of evolution matches
with a vision of the “nature of the person” which was known by classical
Christian authors. Think of the very distinctive relationship between pas-
sions, emotions, and virtues, outlined by Thomas Aquinas and how moral
education could be considered (Pope 2007, 265–267; Pope 2009, 204).
The Christian moral life can thus be interpreted in the classical sense as
grace perfecting nature, building on the natural capacities, correcting and
improving them where necessary. By doing this, our ethic gains realism and
stays into close contact with human experiences. It allows seeing how acts
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of altruism can be interpreted only “natural” within the domestic sphere
and within the community of close friends. Asking altruism on a universal
level is asking too much from human beings. At the same time it allows us
to see that there are also exceptional people who are capable of generosity
and self-giving to other people which they do not know and with which
no form of reciprocity is involved (Cornwall 2007). That religions—albeit
exceptionally—can bring people to such forms of detachment and disin-
terestedness is probably from the ethical point of view their main reason
of existence.
CONCLUSION
Ethics after Darwin is no longer an exclusively theological or philosophi-
cal discipline. Biologists and neuroscientists present divergent statements
about the biological roots of morality. Orthodox Darwinists are diamet-
rically opposed to Huxlians. Whoever sees morality as an evolutionary
product, has for de Waal a more livable world in mind than Huxley and
followers. But Huxley, who always publicly defended Darwin’s theory of
evolution in Victorian England, concluded his Romanes-lecture at Oxford
in 1893 with the memorable cautionary statement: “Let us understand,
once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating
the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in fighting it”
(Ruse 2009).
Is there a Darwinian meta-ethics? Hyper-Darwinists believe so (Kitcher
2006). Hyper-Darwinism supports a distinct meta-ethical view that neces-
sarily puts the truth of moral judgments into question and even argues that
moral knowledge is impossible. Moderate Darwinism believes that evolu-
tionary biology does contribute to a better understanding of some aspects
of the human moral behavior and may explain why people are interested
in the development of social systems, but its evolutionary influence is not
far-reaching. Finally, there is a third group of interpretations which states
that recognition of forms of evolutionary relationship better enables us to
understand our obligations to others. Kitcher thinks that natural selection
has played an important role in the development of moral consciousness
and sees morality as a fitness strategy, just as the development of limbs
and senses in the past. But culture has taken the upper hand. He swings
between two extremes: between those who believe that everything is truly
cultural (the blank slate hypothesis) and those who argue that everything
is fundamentally biological (the genetic determinism hypothesis). However,
Kitcher brings in an important nuance. On the basis of the history of
codification, starting with Hammurabi, he describes in great detail how
the growing interest in legal systems can be regarded as the continuation
of efforts to avoid among hominids violence (Kitcher 1985; Kitcher 2006,
175–176). However, after a while such pacification strategies live a life of
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their own and should not be linked any longer to the idea of “reproductive
success.”
One hundred years later, evolutionary biologist George C. Williams
still wholeheartedly agrees with Huxley. The title of his article is: “Mother
Nature Is a Wicked Old Witch” (Williams 1993). For Christian ethics
there is a twofold caution. (1) A too extensive naturalistic view of morality
cannot be accepted by Christian ethicists. A morality based purely on
nature becomes essentialist and totalizing. Those who views ethics from a
deterministic view of human nature, confuses “is” and “ought.” This view
certainly leads to aberrations such as Francis Galton, Darwin’s cousin, who
refused to help the needy because doing nothing would be more consistent
with “nature” and therefore gave support to eugenic experiments simply
because they are “natural.” Such forms of legitimation of inequality explain
the healthy suspicion of a Christian ethicist vis-a`-vis what science has to
say about morality. (2) A strong naturalistic view of morality cannot but
think that there is only seemingly kindness and selflessness. For Dawkins
altruism is disguised selfishness: selfish genes try to secure their own survival
and allocate therefore an altruistic tactics (Dawkins 1976, 3). Maintaining
familial genes, reciprocity (tit-for-tat), honor (generosity), and power drive
are the true origins of altruism. They also explain the at times strong urge to
self-sacrifice. Such a reductionist view of ethics is for Christian ethicists not
acceptable because it results in a cynical view of ethical behavior. Without
a minimum level of authenticity, the ethical becomes eroded.
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List, please supply full publication de-
tails.
Q5 Author: Reference Pope (2006) has
been changed to Pope (2006) so that
this citation matches the Reference
List. Please check for correctness.
Q6 Author: Please provide year of publi-
cation in Reference Aquinas (2013).
Q7 Author: Please check References Axel-
rod (1984) and Buskes (2006) as type-
set for correctness.
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Q8 Author: Reference Barlow (1958) has
not been cited in the text. Please indi-
cate where it should be cited; or delete
from the Reference List.
Q9 Author: Please provide page range in
Reference Boniolo and Anna (2006).
Q10 Author: Please provide publisher name
in Reference Buskes (2006).
Q11 Author: Please provide page range in
Reference Buskes (2010).
Q12 Author: Please provide publisher name
in References Darwin (1859, 1871,
1872).
Q13 Author: Reference Darwin (2010) has
not been cited in the text. Please indi-
cate where it should be cited; or delete
from the Reference List.
Q14 Author: Please provide first name of
author in Reference Edelman (1992)
in full.
Q15 Author: If this is not a one-page article
please supply the first and last pages
for this article in Reference Gould and
Eldridge (1993).
Q16 Author: Please provide the page range
for this chapter in Reference Mc-
Cormick (2006).
Q17 Author: Please provide the page range
for this chapter in Reference Ruse
(2006).
Q18 Author: Please provide the page range
for this chapter in Reference Ruse
(2009).
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Q19 Author: Please provide volume no.
and page range in Reference Wallace
(1864).
Q20 Author: Please check Reference West-
ermarck (1906) as typeset for correct-
ness.
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